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A COMMENT ON THE LAW OF TORTS

Luke K. Cooperrider*
HE recently-published treatise by Professors Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, which is the subject of this article is
no routine publication. It is not a mere recasting in different
language of an already familiar synthesis; nor is it the kind of
book one keeps around for casual reference. It is, rather, a statement of a philosophy of tort liability which, by reason of its
consonance with much of the currently vocal thought in the
field, and by reason of the powers of analysis and expression that
the authors have brought to bear, is almost certainly destined to
be one of those landmark works which occupy a generative rather
than merely derivative relation to the law. No lawyer who hopes
to be well informed with regard to current and probable future
developments in tort law can afford not to examine it, and this
means examination in the round, not by occasional limited reference. This is not to imply that he will find such a task burdensome, for the literary, one might almost say narrative, qualities of
the book are indeed unusual. Here is a law book with a plot.
For these reasons, and because it is the work of such eminent
authors, it is with great trepidation that I venture upon a commentary which, because of my own convictions regarding the
function and content of tort law and the proper function, in our
system, of the judges to whom it is entrusted, must be a vigorous
criticism. This criticism goes not to the authors' interpretation
of the law as it is, an interpretation which is, in my opinion, both
accurate and uniquely helpful, but to their belief as to what it
ought to be, and therefore to the direction which they seek to impose upon future development. The discrepancy between the "is"
and the "ought" the authors find principally in that segment of the
law which applies to "accidents." But before encountering this, the
subject of controversy, I should like to describe briefly and comment upon the treatise as a whole.
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It is in three volumes. Volume 3 contains a conventional
index and table of cases, plus a table of statutes and a fifty-page
bibliography of periodical literature organized in accordance
with the chapter headings of the treatise. This innovation alone
would be an extremely valuable addition to the library of any
lawyer concerned with tort problems.
The text of the treatise is divided into three "Parts." Reading
from right to left, "Part Three," entitled "Conflict of Laws" is a
short chapter which attempts little more than to suggest the choice
of law problem as it affects tort litigation. It will serve as an effective memorandum of an issue that may otherwise frequently be
overlooked. The remaining 950 pages of Volume 2 are occupied by
"Part Two" of the text, entitled "Accidents," of which more
later. Volume 1 contains "Part One" which, apparently because
a title such as "Those Subjects Ordinarily Dealt With in a Treatise
on Torts Which Are Not Covered in Part Two" is somewhat
lacking in elegance, the authors have called "Intended Torts."
In addition to the subjects which are customarily so described this
part includes chapters on defamation, business torts, misrepresentation, tort liability as affected by family relationships, recovery for
emotional disturbances and contributory tortfeasors.
Part One is a conventional approach to that part of the subject matter assigned to it. Much of it will be not unfamiliar to
those who have used Professor Harper's 1933 text. There have been
added a liberal cross reference to the Restatement and, in the body
of the text, an occasional quotation from principal cases to throw
light on judicial attitudes in particular circumstances. In comparison to the old Harper, the chapters on Malicious Prosecution,
Defamation and Misrepresentation have undergone the most extensive revision, and can be regarded as substantially new treatments. Particularly worthy of notice is the very extensive and
penetrating analysis of the policy basis of liability in these areas.
The Malicious Prosecution chapter, for instance, offers1 a comparative discussion of malicious prosecution, false arrest and defamation-a concordance and rationalization of the three torts
which should prove most useful to a lawyer who may be uncertain
which line of thinking to pursue in the case at hand.

1 Sections 4.11, 4.12. Section and page numbers in this and succeeding footnotes are
references to HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956.
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The discussion of the basis of liability for misrepresentation
also deserves special mention. The authors have made a valiant
attempt2 to impose a system upon these cases. The system is intellectually attractive enough, and my principal doubt relates to
its effectiveness as a control. The point is made, and with this it
seems to me impossible to disagree, that the courts in making use
of the "misrepresentation as of his own knowledge" technique are
in fact branding as fraudulent statements which may have been
honestly and even innocently made. Recognizing this, then, as an
instrument of strict liability, the authors suggest that the criterion
of liability in any particular case is "What does common sense,
in view of the accepted business and social mores of the community, entitle one person to expect from another who purports
to furnish information or make statements for his guidance in a
business transaction?" The circumstances will indicate to the
(judge's? jury's?) common sense whether a person of ordinary
intelligence would be expected to rely upon the actor's statements. In some situations (trade talk) the danger signals are so
distinct that no person will be permitted to say he relied even on
the honesty of the statement, because few persons would. In other
situations a person in plaintiff's position may be "practically justified in expecting sincerity and honesty ... but nothing further." 3
In still other situations, because "the ethics of business practice"
justify it, the one may be expected to use reasonable care to avoid
misleading the other. And finally "there are situations in which
action is commonly taken in business negotiations in reliance upon
the assumed existence of certain facts. Business proceeds upon the
assumption that representations are true." This includes the case
where the actor's "manner of giving the information constitutes
such an assumption of complete knowledge that the psychological
effect upon the other is calculated to divert that self-protective investigation which might otherwise be made." 4
This is not the place, and I am not now prepared, to criticize
this rationale in detail. But I doubt that all or even nearly all "trade
talk" cases have involved situations wherein "common sense"
would indicate that the ordinarily intelligent buyer or seller
would have placed no faith in the honesty of his opposite num-

2

Sections 7.4-7.7.

SP. 541.
4Ibid.
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her. I also doubt that the "as of his own knowledge" routine is
restricted to those situations where the party claiming he has been
deceived has in fact been disarmed by the assertiveness of the
other's statement. When vendor says to purchaser that the boundary of the lot which he wishes to sell lies along the line A-B, certainly the one understands as well as the other, whether the statement is made loudly or softly, in terms of "I know" or only "I
think," that the most that can be said is "To the best of my knowledge." So although I think the authors' rationale sheds much
light on these cases in a general way, and is a very distinct aid to
understanding, I do not believe it to be a case description which
is accurate in detail. I should not leave the impression that the
authors claim it is, for they concede that "in some instances . . .
the case law seems to defy clarification." But I would argue further
that, if it is deemed desirable to impose upon the decision of actual cases some sort of control along the lines the authors have
indicated, taking into consideration the new style aloofness of
the judge from application of the law to the fa<:ts of the case,
standards as general as these are much too flabby to do the job.
The organization of materials in Volume 1 has a distinct advantage over other recent treatises from the point of view of the
practicing lawyer. All matters concerning intentional interference
with the possession and use of land, including trespass and its
privileges and nuisance, are concentrated in one chapter. One
who needs to do so, and certainly this is the principal benefit a
practicing lawyer receives from a treatise, can quickly and painlessly put his problem in context by reading ninety consecutive
pages of the book, and be relatively certain he has touched all
bases. To the student or teacher, who is more likely to be interested
in the generality of a concept, this arrangement is less appropriate
and involves some repetition in discussion of privilege. It is not,
however, a serious inconvenience. Negligent injury to land and
strict liability are of course located elsewhere, but categories as
large as these are not frequently overlooked. Interference with
chattels (trespass, conversion, and appropriate privileges) is treated
in the same way, as is interference with the person. The former
has received a much more detailed treatment (120 pages) than is
customary in treatises on torts, which is, in my estimation, a further
recommendation.
Volume 2 departs entirely from the black-letter style of hornbook and restatement and actually constitutes a collection of
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essays on the various major points connected with what the authors call "accident liability." It is an excellent commentary, and
nothing which I have to say about it should leave any impression
to the contrary. Most of these essays again have a familiar look to
those who have followed Professor James' publications in the
periodicals, but the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
In particular the chapter on Legal Cause comes as close to imparting an understanding of that problem as anything in print
of which I am aware. The traumatized researcher will be comforted to encounter here some reassurance in the statement that
"the fact is that in a great number of situations it makes very little
difference what test is used." "And in such situations it is obvious
from even cursory reading of the cases that many courts indulge in
random, standard definitions of proximate cause merely as a
'warm-up' exercise; formulas are collected indiscriminately and
then often accorded no further consideration (by relating them
to the merits of the case, and the like)." 5 The chapters on the
Nature of Negligence, Function of the Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, and Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land are
also particularly helpful.
The significance of the title chosen for Part Two is explained,
and the choice justified, by the first three chapters in the volume.
These chapters the reader should most certainly examine, at an
early opportunity, for himself, but because they are basic to any
critique of this part of the treatise their content must be described
here in some detail.
The authors are greatly concerned with the number of accidents that occur every year in the United States, with the human
and economic costs of these accidents to our society, and with the
random incidence of that cost upon individuals, their families, and
persons dealing with them, an incidence which, inevitably, is
highly regressive. They are further concerned with the inadequacy
of the common law system of tort liability as an instrument for
dealing rationally with this problem. They compare, unfavorably,
that system, which requires the injured person to seek compensation through the judicial process, with all the delays, uncertainties
and further economic loss which this entails, with the workmen's
compensation system which provides promptness and certainty of
award and payment.
5

P. 1160, n. 48.

1296

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

Their attention next is directed to the causes of accidents in
modern life. An examination of various studies made in the past
twenty-five years convinces them that a large proportion of all
accidents are consequences of "accident proneness"; e.g., statistics
are quoted which indicate that 4 percent of all drivers cause one
third of all automobile accidents. Going behind this proposition
they then give a short summary of conclusions they find in the
literature as to the causes of accident proneness in various contexts,
industrial accident, the highway, the home, etc. At this point I
have some difficulty following the argument. The authors seem
to conclude that there is relatively little correlation between this
factor and physical or "psychomotor" characteristics, that there
is greater correlation with mental attitudes and characteristics
(depression) anxiety, etc.), and that youth and inexperience are
associated with a disproportionate number of accidents-a fact
which they conclude has little significance to their inquiry. They
wind up with this statement: 6
"Significant for their absence from the causes of accident
proneness are 'carelessness' or 'fault.' 'Recent medical research
has shown that "accident proneness" may be an innate characteristic of some individuals and a personal phenomenon independent of any question of responsibility, conscious action
or blameworthiness.' "
At this point the statement appears quite tentative, and the
evidence adduced to support it is, for me, less than satisfactory.
It is important, however, to note it carefully, for it is a leitmotif that recurs throughout the remainder of the work, the
foundation for the very extensive critique of modern tort concepts which follows. The absence of "blameworthiness" in the
personal conduct which causes accidents is the nub.
The argument next proceeds to a critique of the current concept of the general basis of liability in tort, i.e., of the idea that
"fault" is a condition of liability and should be a condition of
liability. They submit first that that fault which is sufficient to
support an action in negligence does not correspond in fact to
moral blameworthiness, at least to the extent that the criteria of
negligence are objective rather than subjective, because the fault

6 P. 740. In the second sentence the authors are quoting Bristol, "Medical Aspects
of Accident Control," 107 A.M.A.J. 653 at 654 (1936).
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principle achieves its general odor of fairness "from the assumption
that the actor had a choice and of his own free will chose a culpable
line of conduct and was therefore morally to blame." Hence, to
compare a man's conduct with an abstract standard when in fact
he may have been unable to conform because of slow reaction,
faulty perception, poor judgment or main awkwardness is not
consistent with the basic assumption. The development of the
fault criterion of liability is then explained as "another manifestation of the individualism which underlies laissez faire as a political philosophy." "A fleet of trucks cannot be operated, a railroad
run, or a skyscraper built without the certainty that the enterprise will take some toll in human life and limb. It is the very gist
of the fault principle to privilege the entrepreneur to take this
toll, so long as the activity is lawful and carried on with reasonable care." 7
Comparing their conclusions as to the causes of the great bulk
of all accidents with their concept of morality, the authors conclude that the fault principle does not in fact produce results
which are morally supportable, and that if the law were to be
further "refined" so as to make liability rest more nearly on personal blameworthiness the result would be even more indefensible,
as it would tend to send large numbers of accident victims home
empty-handed. Their answer to this dilemma is to fall back on a
"broader moral consideration," "social morality," which calls for
a distribution of all accident losses over society without regard
to fault. Naturally such a principle would better serve one objective of a legal system dealing with accidental loss, compensation of the victims. Further than this, the authors submit, a strict
liability system, by bringing into play affirmative remedial conduct
on the part of insurance companies, industrial corporations, and
other large loss-bearing units, would be superior to the faultbased present system in deterring accident-causing conduct. In
answer to the argument that such a change would place an undue
economic burden on enterprise they suggest that a system similar
to workmen's compensation, with fixed limitations on recovery,
might well be no more expensive than the present law with its
unlimited liability.
Finally, in a chapter entitled "The Principle of Social Insur-

7P. 752.
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ance," the authors produce an additional thought-provoking
thesis. Fault as a condition of liability is bound up with the assumption, true when it arose, that the lawsuit is a contest between
the two parties alone, that all that can be accomplished is to shift
the loss that has occurred from the shoulders of the victim to the
shoulders of the person who caused it, and that there is no social
gain from this and no reason for doing it except to satisfy a demand for fairness and deter dangerous conduct. ·"Fairness" in an
individualist society was identified with the idea that one should
not be liable in the absence of fault. Today, on the other hand,
accidental loss presents a much greater problem than it has in the
past. It falls on the shoulders of people who can ill afford it, and
the best way to deal with it is to compensate the victim without
regard to how it occurred and shift the loss not to another individual but to society generally, or some large segment of it, thus
saving the victim from ruin without placing an undue burden
on the innocent cause. They then proceed to show that our present
common law system goes farther toward accomplishing this end
than one might at first suppose. Consider, for instance, the effect
of such factors as strict liability arising from extrahazardous activity, res ipsa loquitur, vicarious liability, compulsory automobile
insurance, automobile owners' responsibility laws, comparative
negligence statutes, etc., some of which tend to assure liability
in the first instance, others of which, combined with the increasing
prevalence of liability insurance, tend to spread the loss that
is thus imposed. The total practical effect is augmented by the
practices of insurance companies themselves, e.g., the broadening of coverage of policies to include others than the named insured, medical payments provisions, and settlement practices
(which the authors find tend to assure prompt and adequate compensation without regard to fault to persons suffering minor injuries, but do not do the same for major victims).
This indicates the general basis of their critique, and the general outline of the system the authors believe should prevail. An
acceptable system would (I) assure that all persons injured by
accident receive at least a basic compensation for that injury.
That compensation, perhaps, should not include such inflatable
items as pain and suffering, which the authors do not believe represent an actual hard-money loss, and should perhaps be arranged
on an installment basis and subject to limitations in amount, in
analogy to workmen's compensation, but the contours on this
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side of the coin are by no means so distinct as on the other. (2) The
system should be so designed that the ultimate incidence of liability would be upon an agency-insurance company; large corporation, etc.-which could and would distribute the cost widely
through the instrumentality of price, either of product, service or
insurance policy. This picture of an ideal state of law is about
as far as the authors go in the direction of a systematic proposal.
Approving references are made to such things as the proposals for
a statutory automobile compensation plan and recent literature
advocating "enterprise liability," but they have neither a legislative program nor a systematic accident jurisprudence of their
own to promote. Only in the product liability field do they advocate that the courts, on their own responsibility, openly depart
from that principle of liability which they now follow and accept
instead implied warranty as the basic rule. For the rest, the
authors are content, having isolated what they consider to be the
basic oughts, to refer back to them constantly as criteria for
evaluating the decisions and the rules which make up the corpus
of the law relating to liability for accidentally-caused injury. As
I read their book these principles, which are for them basic, can
be summarized as two slogans, "Let All Accident Victims Be
Compensated," and "Let The Loss Be Spread." They apparently
contemplate that with these slogans constantly before them,
the courts will be able to remake the law themselves. Legal
questions will be resolved in conscious accordance with the slogans;
fact questions will be so resolved, consciously or no, in a great
majority of instances by the jury.
There remains to be examined the effect which their basic
assumptions have upon the authors' approach to the substance of
the law. Every legal principle and the result of every case is examined through one lens. The principle or decision is good if it
tends to further the objectives expressed by the slogans. It is
bad if it seems to look in the other direction-without regard to
other criteria. The consequence is that with reference to existing doctrine the authors take a distinctly and professedly ambivalent attitude. The principal objective is to make it easy for
the plaintiff to recover, since the loss-spreading objective can be
left with a light heart to defendants' instincts of self-preservation.
With this in mind the authors recognize, rejoice in, and seek to
exploit the proverbial tendencies of juries. As the jury is a die
loaded in favor of plaintiff, any rule which tends to send a case

1300

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

to rather than keep it from the jury, or which tends to give the
jury a wider discretion, is to be approved. Any rule having the
opposite effect is to be frmvned upon. One of the best means for
accomplishing this purpose is Brett's magic dictum from Heaven
v. Pender. This principle, that one owes to another an obligation
of care in any case when he should realize that his conduct, if not
carried out with care, will cause danger of injury to that other,
of course is not and never has been law. The authors would like
to make it so and in this way override many of the limitations on
liability which have in the past been phrased in terms of "no duty
of care." For example, as to the duties of the occupant of land
toward trespassers they say: ". . . the traditional rule confers on
an occupier of land a special privilege to be careless which is quite
out of keeping with the development of accident law generally
and is no more justifiable here than it would be in the case of
any other useful enterprise or activity." 8 They harbor similar
opinions concerning the liability of a construction contractor for
injuries caused by defects in the structure after it has been accepted by the owner,9 liability for prenatal injuries,10 and problems
of recovery for injury resulting from negligently caused emotional
disturbance. 11 "It is submitted that these questions will be solved
most justly by applying general principles of duty and negligence,
and that mechanical rules of thumb which are at variance with
these principles do more harm than good." The only limitations
upon the generality of Brett's dictum which the authors accept as
part of their ideal jurisprudence, perhaps because they consider
them not very significant in fact, are the excuse from liability toward the unforeseeable plaintiff and, curiously, for unforeseeable
type of harm.
But beyond the duty hurdle lies the breach. Consistently,
and with complete candor, the authors oppose any restriction
upon the jury's freedom to deal with the problem. The proposition
is that the question of negligence, vel non, in any case involves
only an assessment of the reasonableness of the actor's conduct.
That is a function assigned to the jury, and any judicial invasion
of this function by "rules of thumb" or specific standards of con-

SP. 1440.
9P. 1043.
10 Pp. 1028-1031.
llP. 1039.
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duct ("stop, look and listen," "step in the dark," etc.) is an offense
not only agains~ the theory of common law trial procedure, but
also, and for this reason principally to be condemned, in the generality of its application (including contributory negligence),
against the compensation slogan.
Other examples of applying the same criteria to existing doctrine, to proposed changes, or to the facts of life in a jury trial
are their disapproval of vicarious responsibility based upon joint
enterprise reasoning12 (again because of its application to the contributory negligence issue), their suggestion that the operation
with the consent of the owner type of statute found in the automobile accident field be copied with reference to all "dangerous
instrumentalities," 13 and their joy in the fact that juries customarily disregard instructions on contributory negligence. 14 They
assert and advocate that there is a double standard of negligence
as between plaintiff and defendant, i.e., that the tendency to relax
in favor of subjective standards is noticeable only as to plaintiffs.15
They advocate an objective standard of wanton and willful misconduct, qualified by the proposition that even mere negligence
may constitute wantonness if accompanied by a wanton state of
mind. (And what remains of the guest statute when an unrestrained jury sinks its teeth into this one?)
This general attitude, which in the instances recited above
can be related to the proposition that accidents which result from
conduct which is not morally culpable should nevertheless be
compensated, carries over into issues of the lawsuit which are not
directly related to that proposition. For instance, one who believes that A, who caused an injury to B, should be required to
pay for it whether he was at fault or not, does not necessarily
conclude further that a court should bend over backward to make
it easy for B to prove that he was injured or that the injury was
caused by A. It must be remembered, however, that the critique
of fault as the basis of liability is mere inducement. The operative
principle is the compensation slogan. Therefore the authors' disapproval of "rules of thumb" which tend to limit the discretion
of the jury by imposing standards as to sufficiency of evidence ap-

12 P. 1418.
13 P. 1!!82.
14 Pp. 894,
15 Pp. 904,

1262.
1228.
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plies with reference to proof of cause in fact and damages, as well
as to proof of negligence, contributory negligence, etc. Res ipsa
loquitur, and its recent fancy California offspring, Ybarra v. Spangard and Summers v. Tice, "never had it so good."
And so it goes. There is no neutralism here. The authors have
a p(?sition on everything, and their position is as predictable as
the hour the sun will rise. Because of their consistency, their
willingness to follow their basic assumptions as far as they will
carry, and because of the relentless logic and penetrating analysis
which they bring to bear in the process, it is a position which
is difficult to attack. This is particularly true for the reader who
has not so precisely isolated and identified the basic assumptions
upon which rests his own ideology of tort liability. I believe it
is essential, however, that an attempt be made, for, in the legal
literature of the day, judicial and extra-judicial alike, I hear very
clearly the strains of the bandwagon.
First, let me carve out an area of agreement, or at least of nolo
contendere. I agree that the accident problem in America is a most
serious problem, and that the sum total of human misery would
be distinctly reduced if it were not necessary for the unfortunate
victims to shoulder the burden all by themselves. I would suppose, however, that the great bulk of the more serious accidents
of a type appropriate to tort liability occur in one of two contexts,
industrial employment and automobile use. The :first of these two
categories is already, for the most part, treated in accordance with
the authors' theories, and I am not inclined to argue that the
second should not be. The sheer bulk of the automobile accident
problem is such that unusual measures are suggested. Conceivably,
·as Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested, the liability insurers, by
progressively increasing the coverage of their policies, will solve
this problem for us. If they have such ambitions, they should
certainly be encouraged. If they do not, the next question, presumably, is whether a compensation scheme analogous to workmen's compensation is feasible. That is a question which can
hardly be answered ex cathedra and would seem to be addressed
more appropriately to the legislature than to the judiciary. Possibly analogous action would be appropriate in other accident contexts. But what of the argument that the courts, absent legislative
action, should manipulate their conduct of litigation· in such a
way as to tend to bring about the desired end?
An example of the authors' point of view on a particular prob-
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lem which illustrates how far they are willing to go is their position with reference to the common law misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction. Remember, the basic objective is compensation. The
means to the end is the discountenancing of restrictions upon the
jury. The rule that a person who is in no way responsible for
another's peril has no duty to render assistance to the one imperilled is viewed as "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless,
individualism" which the courts have increasingly tended to restrict in scope. The rule of Union Pacific R. Co. v. Cappier, 16
whereby there is no duty to render assistance even if the plaintiff's
injury is caused by the defendant's non-negligent conduct, is expressly disapproved, on the ground that "there is a growing belief that the beneficiaries of an enterprise which creates risks should
pay for the casualties it inflicts without regard to fault. It is a
lesser burden, by far, to impose on the beneficiaries the milder
duty of furnishing reasonable rescue or first aid. This is simply
requiring a man to minimize the consequences of risks which
society gives him the privilege to create." 17 The authors then point
out a number of respects in which they conceive the basic rule
has been limited in recent cases, from which they find to their
own satisfaction that a "trend" exists, and argue finally: 18
"It may not be long before some pioneering court will take
the further step urged by Ames some fifty years ago. Plaintiff has been injured by defendant's inexcusable failure to
act under circumstances wherein action would be effective,
easy, and commanded by every social and moral consideration.
The real basis of objection to liability is that the law should
not try to enforce unselfishness or make one man serve his
fellows. In a society whose values are still significantly individualistic, this objection deserves great weight. But, we
submit, those values would be properly safeguarded under
Ames's rule by its careful limitations and its coincidence
with the universal moral judgment of our society." [Emphasis
supplied.]
I respectfully submit that the authors are here guilty of the
same fallacy which they have criticized in other contexts, that
of thinking of the rules of tort law as rules of human conduct rath-

16 66
17P.

Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903).
1047.
lSP. 1049.
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er than as mere criteria for adjudication between two parties of a
claim for money. Part of their critique of the fault principle is that
it involves an assumption that legal liability will deter faulty conduct, an assumption which they question. It seems quite clear to
me that nobody, with the possible exception of a timid lawyer or
a malpractice-sensitive doctor, will be influenced in his actual
conduct by the rule which here prevails, whichever way it goes.
The bystanders at the scene of a drowning or other tragedy are
not likely to consult attorneys before acting or withholding action.
The problem, then, is not whether the law should try to make
man serve his fellows, but whether Joe Smith, who did not, or
rather as to whom-if the evidence were interpreted most strongly
in favor of the plaintiff-it would be possible to say that he did
not react with the promptness and competence that he should
have displayed, should be subjected to the peril that a jury, exercising its ex post facto discretion perhaps years after the event,
will require him to pay for X's misfortune. Even in the authors'
own frame of reference, I have never been able to understand
why Joe Smith rather than X should pay the premiums on this
insurance. X would have suffered the same misfortune if Smith
had never been born.
The rule here under attack is one which is intimately associated with what remains of the autonomy of the individual. To
say that society should succor the unfortunate is one thing. To say
that George should have done it, and if he did not he should be
made to smart, is quite another. The authors' response is that
there is no real difficulty because the rule which would impose
liability can be suitably hedged, e.g., "defendant might be held
only where a reasonable man would have realized plaintiff's grave
danger, and lack of danger to himself, and where reasonably effective means of rescue were easily accessible as defendant knew
or should have known, etc."19 And this, of course, is the conventional argument for razing any of the common law barriers to
liability. They are made to appear out of line, out of date, irrational, arbitrary, and one is assured that no danger will accompany their removal because there will be substituted only the
usual standard of reasonable conduct. So it is said of all the "rules
of thumb" and duty limitations. It is sought only to impose the

19P.

1046, n. 9.
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normal responsibility for conduct, and no man will ?e held liable
unless his conduct was unreasonable. This argument, of course,
assumes away the whole problem. It becomes a mockery when,
as here, the proponents have elsewhere maintained that all these
questions must be left to the jury and that juries automatically
find for plaintiff. To overturn this rule means that A who merely
walks down the street subjects himself to the peril that he will
encounter a situation which will permit X to sue him and take
his all because, with the help of clever counsel, X can persuade
a jury that A did not make use of reasonably effective means of
rescue which were, as A knew or should have known, easily accessible to him. In my opinion it is a reckless suggestion and
would have no effective limitation. It could, however, operate quite
effectively to blanket in under the system a large segment of accidental loss that might otherwise go uncompensated because it
could not be attributed to the affirmative conduct of any conceivable defendant.
These instances will suffice to suggest the ultimate implications of the book. I raise my voice in dissent for a number of
reasons. Starting from the assumption that individual accidental
losses are losses to society, and compensation of such loss is a social
gain, the authors conclude that society should take affirmative
steps to guarantee that the compensation will occur. In passing,
we might point out that there is no essential difference in this
respect between accidental loss and any other kind of loss. The
individual and society will be handicapped to the same extent
by disability which results from illness as by that which results
from accident, by economic loss from natural causes as by loss
from accident, and, for that matter, the individual whose impecuniousness results from his own improvidence or incapacity,
or from the vagaries of the economy, labors under a handicap not
different in kind from that which, in the instance of accidental
injury, the authors seek to remedy by means of the money judgment. It may be a pertinent inquiry, therefore, whether if one
starts with such comprehensive objectives there is any reason to
consider accidental loss as a peculiar problem. It is only one of
the elements of distributional inequality in any social system which
is not the embodiment of the principle "to each according to his
needs." I do not mean to imply that it is impossible or undesirable
to seek the remedy of one ill while others are left unattended.
I do suggest, however, that the system the authors contemplate,
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using their own basic assumptions as the criteria, would be incomplete, both internally and externally. There would be a proportion of accidental losses which would be uncompensated, if
for no other reason than that the unfortunate plaintiff would
find himself in the increasingly improbable position of being able
to find nobody to blame but himself. There would also be large
categories of loss, not accidental in origin but of an equal significance to society, which would be untouched by the system.
Aside from this, the "loss distribution" aspect of the system
is a naked assumption, the validity of which there is reason to
doubt.20 The ability of a given defendant to pass on the loss
imposed upon it would depend in large part upon extrinsic factors such as the general condition of the economy, the defendant's
competitive position, etc. The distribution, therefore, would actually occur in an uneven manner, with the consequence that to
a greater or less degree in individual instances the loss would
rest exactly where it was imposed by the court. If this fact is combined with the natural consequence of the authors' allocation
of function between judge and jury, a capricious original incidence
of liability, the resultant it seems to me is indefensible.
,
A statutory insurance scheme designed to cover medical costs
and permanent disability arising from accidental causes, supported
in some measure out of tax funds, would be a more logical derivative of the authors' basic assumptions. There would be more
complete coverage, the recovery could be subjected to reasonable
controls, and less violence would be done to the integrity of the
common law system. If universal compensation is the objective,
should it not be accomplished through a scheme that would compensate the loss without forcing upon plaintiff and his counsel
the undignified beating of the bushes for a "connectible" defendant? Furthermore, it seems perfectly reasonable to refer such a
problem as we have here to the legislative power which, let us
hope, still has some function to perform in the establishment of
such broad policy as we are here discussing. Such a referral, though
it may be more typical of the nineteenth century than of our
emancipated modern courts, would also be a test of the authors'
assumption that the behavior patterns of juries in individual cases

20 Plant, "Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Prod•
ucts," 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 at 946 (1957).
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are strong evidence of a deep-seated popular feeling of need for
drastic change in the law.
In other words, as it seems to me, one who shares the authors'
basic assumptions that the most important function of tort law
is to assure compensation might well be repelled by the way in
which the authors contemplate this objective should ultimately
be achieved. Their system would be stigmatized by gross inequalities of treatment as between injured persons and as between defendants and, so far as I can see, by an unsystematic and fortuitous
distribution of the cost burden. It would involve imposition of
liability which in many cases would have a heavily punitive effect
upon individuals as well as upon business organizations (whose
feelings are not worthy of consideration) in many instances where
the person mulcted would quite reasonably have no feeling of
responsibility whatever for what had occurred-indeed, as in the
occupant of land cases, he might well feel that he himself was
the injured party.
In large measure the authors seem to advocate that the courts
substitute for the traditional framework of decision in accident
cases one guiding principle-legal questions shall be so resolved
as to advance the principle of universal compensation. This principle is to be applied, not only to the interpretation of judicial
precedent, but also to the construction of statutes, although the
consequence is a light regard for statutory language.21 If a court
should consciously follow their urgings in toto, its doing so would
involve an assumption of legislative powers considerably more
grandiose than those, even, to which we have become accustomed.
If it is competent for a court to make such decisions, must we not
recognize the possibility that other persons may have other views
as to what should be the guiding principle of tort law and, if so,
must they not have their days in court? Should we then be surprised if the lobby forms just outside the judge's chambers? Is a
trial, or at least an appellate argument, to take on the aspect of
a legislative committee hearing? Without the paraphernalia of ·
the legislative committee, can it be argued that a court is equipped
to make decisions such as these? Is there nothing involved here
but a philosophical principle which can be accepted simply on the
basis of one's own intellectual conviction of its validity, supported
by the abstract arguments of a legal treatise?
21

Wrongful death statute, p. 1333; sales act, p. 1576; guest statute, p. 961.
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A greater probability is that courts which have no such grandiose ambitions may, without realizing the full implications of
their actions, accomplish the same end by accepting the urgings
of these authors in many seemingly minor details. There are
many places where their arguments based upon the compensation
principle are reinforced by aesthetic principles, and where for
that reason a court is most likely to give way. The result will be
to accelerate a development already underway which carries the
marks of a remaking, not only of the jurisprudence of this country,
but of the entire fabric of political control. The potentiality of
this change has always been with us by reason of our carefully
nurtured illusion that "the common law" is one system. This
fiction was innocuous enough when stare decisis was a conviction
of sufficient strength to impose a degree of discipline upon the
law of the separate jurisdictions. That restraining hand is being
shaken off, however, as the courts begin to take seriously what
they have been told about their "legislative powers." When this
happens, and the commanding sound of its own voice out of the
past fades into the background, a court feels most strongly the
need for a means of deciphering the scrambled message from the
other forty-eight jurisdictions. The consequence is an ever-increasing judicial reliance upon the treatise, restatement or monograph,
the work of a "systematizer" who by his very nature is subject to an
extreme degree to the pressure of an idea. The judge of the old
school conceived of his function in terms of marginal differentiation between cases. His differentiations, of course, had a discretionary quality, but the discretion was exercised on an ad hoc basis,
within the general framework of earlier decision, and had, therefore, an effectively if not distinctly circumscribed scope. The method has its disadvantages; its product is likely to be untidy, at best,
and the trees may frequently obscure the wood. But surely it is the
very essence of the common law aspect of our political system and
the basis of our willingness to live in large measure free of a
"written law." These limited acts of discretion we have been content to leave to the magistrate, conscious of the necessity which
requires it, and confident that the great decisions which establish and change broad policies and determine the essential framwork of society will be made by the elected political representatives over whom we exercise a direct control. The "systematizer,"
however, is subject to such a limitation only to the extent that he
chooses voluntarily to recognize it and, because of his remote view
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and intellectual compulsion to generalize, he will tend to a
greater or lesser degree to reject it. Furthermore, because he has
no home jurisdiction and can be selective about the authority he
chooses to "follow," and because in the reports of the more than
half a hundred common law jurisdictions he can find authority,
direct or analogical, for almost any position he may wish to take,
the ideal system he derives is in fact his system-a set of concepts
constructed around and designed to effectuate his own views as to
the basic policy of the law-though it is clothed with the appearance of judicial parenthood. So compiled and so shaped it goes
back to the courts, who accept it as the product of enlightened
opinion and, because they no longer feel bound by their own
earlier decisions and do not wish to be thought backward, as the
guide for decision in litigated cases. Undoubtedly great progress
has occurred in our jurisprudence, made possible by these very
facts. So long as the changes made are corrective in nature, involving "legislation" of approximately the same amplitude as
that which we have customarily committed to our courts, the
effect is probably largely beneficial. I submit, however, that when
appellate courts in the exuberance of their newly-recognized freedom to make the small decisions begin to operate upon the assumption that they are equally free to make the great decisions_.
they exceed the scope of their warrant.
The subject of this discussion, however, is not the court
which sees itself as a super-legislature, but rather the court which,
because it no longer feels itself strictly bound by its earlier decisions, tends for that reason to give greater weight than it has in
the past to outside authority, on a case by case basis. The constant
aesthetic urge to reorganize the law in accordance with ever
broader generalizations mingles with these authors' primary compensation principle to produce the greatest pressure upon traditional common law rules at those points where their contours are
not regular. In negligence law the great generalizations are Brett's
dictum at the duty level and the definition of negligent conduct in
terms of a departure from a jury-determined norm of reasonableness at the breach level. Thus any "no duty rule" not based upon
the scope of foreseeable danger, and any "rule of thumb" which
subtracts from the jury's power to determine the "reasonableness"
of the parties' conduct, not only tend to defeat compensation in
some cases but also are aberrational in terms of the aesthetic principle and therefore to be decried by all right thinking jurists. The
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judge who yields to these point-by-point pressures will be convinced that he is vindicating rather than working against the common law tradition. If you accept the compensation principle as
the controlling criterion of liability in tort you will not be bothered by this. If you are still so medieval in your outlook as to _believe that criterion must be defined in terms of some other concept
or view of justice, you may be, because the irregularities of contour
which are now being "rectified" were the product not only of judicial respect for the autonomy of the individual, but also of judicial realism as to the validity of the results the courts could hope
to achieve.
There is much more at stake here than superficially appears,
for a "law" of negligence derived from such all-encompassing generalizations as these is not a system of law at all, but only a conceptual conduit through which all cases are funneled into the
jury room. The trial judge, whose will to direct a verdict for
·insufficiency of evidence is rapidly being beaten down by the
appellate courts,22 by these two related developments will lose all
· opportunity to control the outcome of the case. The articulated
principles of law, whatever may be their content, will appear only
as instructions to the jury, and hence will have at most a precatory
· effect. The actual criteria for the adjudication of the claim will
be solely those which the par.ticular jury, in the individual case,
chooses in its uncontrolled discretion to apply in the secrecy of
the jury room, unencumbered by the embarrassing necessity of
explaining its decision. This, of course, has always been true to
some extent, but so long as there was available to the judge a
selection of devices for disposing of the case without or despite
a jury verdict, the consequences could be kept within tolerable
limits, i.e., within that group of cases where reasonable men really

22 The lead in this movement is being assumed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in cases arising under the FELA. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500
(1957); Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); Ferguson v. -Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957). While these cases themselves involved not the reversal
of verdicts directed by trial courts, but rather the reversal of appellate decisions that
the verdict should have been directed, the conclusion of one who examines them must
he that it is a rare case indeed in which a directed verdict for defendant will stand.
Although the Court's position here is partly accounted for by its desire to reform the
particular statute, there is no reason to believe the extreme position here taken on the
function of the jury will ,be limited to FELA cases. Consider, for instance, Hopkins v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 930, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Washington, which attracted the support .of three other circuit judges in
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 23 at 34.
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could fairly disagree, and where the litigants, therefore, could
have no real basis for complaint whichever view prevailed. This
involved only an acceptance of the inevitable. It is a far different
proposition if all cases in which plaintiff is able to satisfy the requirement of the more "liberal" contemporary courts that he
produce a token of evidence of negligent conduct which "played
a part"23 in causing his injury are on such showing to be turned
over to the jury for disposition. To me this involves a shocking
abdication of judicial responsibility which is in no measure made
more commendable by the fact that its proponents see it as an
indirect approach to a basis of liability in tort which they deem
preferable to that recognized in the past.
It is, then, entirely possible that without being conscious
of what we are doing we may jettison completely the intricate
system by which our forebears sought to achieve a modicum of
what we have called "rule of law" in favor of one by which disputes between individuals will be committed to the uncontrolled
discretion of the tribunal. And the tribunal, here, is not a trained
and experienced magistrate, full of years and wisdom. It is the
common law jury, a device which, for the ascertainment of truth,
is removed but by two steps from trial by ordeal and by one from
the wager of law. There are those who view this as the ultimate
flowering of the democratic method, and for that reason as a
desirable development. I do not.
The judges of an earlier day were modest in the claims they
were willing to make for the law of torts. They did not conceive
that it was their mission to sally forth to remedy all the ills of
society armed only with the money judgment. There were areas
of conflict between persons where, by reason of the limitations of
their techniques, they frankly feared to tread, recognizing the
danger that their interference, in the long run and in the generality of cases, would work more harm than good. They understood juries as well as Messrs. Harper and James, and because
they assumed that their function was, to the extent possible, to
do justice according to law between plaintiff and defendant, they
worked out a system of checks and balances between judge and
jury so that that objective could at least be approached. To my

23 Apparently now established as the test for cause in fact in FELA cases. See the
Supreme Court opinions cited in note 22, and Thomson v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 353
U.S. 926 (1957)
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mind that modesty of objectives was and is sound. To my mind,
further, a jurisprudence which contemplates that the judiciary
shall, on the one hand, assume the burden of legislating to the
extent of radically changing the broad and far-reaching underlying policy of the law, and on the other hand shall abdicate
completely to the jury the function of applying that Policy to the
case at hand, is not. Its ·substantial acceptance by the courts
would, it seems to me, subject to grave question the continuing
validity of the common law system itself.

